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Abstract This article lists fourteen open problems in
artificial life, each of which is a grand challenge requiring a
major advance on a fundamental issue for its solution. Each
problem is briefly explained, and, where deemed helpful,
some promising paths to its solution are indicated.
1 Introduction
At the dawn of the last century, Hilbert proposed a set of open mathematical problems.
They proved to be an extraordinarily effective guideline for mathematical research in
the following century. Based on a substantial body of existing mathematical theory,
the challenges were both precisely formulated and positioned so that a significant body
of missing theory needed to be developed to achieve their solution, thereby enriching
mathematics as a whole.
In contrast with mathematics, artificial life is quite young and essentially interdis-
ciplinary. The phrase “artificial life” was coined by C. Langton [11], who envisaged
an investigation of life as it is in the context of life as it could be. Although artificial
life is fundamentally directed towards both the origins of biology and its future, the
scope and complexity of its subject require interdisciplinary cooperation and collabo-
ration. This broadly based area of study embraces the possibility of discovering lifelike
behavior in unfamiliar settings and creating new and unfamiliar forms of life, and its
major aim is to develop a coherent theory of life in all its manifestations, rather than an
historically contingent documentation bifurcated by discipline. Artificial life’s practical
implications are no less sweeping than its scientific implications. It can guide how we
use new technologies for extending life and creating new forms of it, including drugs,
prosthetics, the Internet, evolvable hardware, and proliferating robots. It has a vast
potential for both good and harm, with a serious need for public debate and ethical
clarity.
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Artificial life’s youth and mix of disciplines, as well as its practical consequences,
only increase the value of publishing a list of its key open problems. Authors at
the Seventh International Conference on Artificial Life were explicitly invited to relate
their research to the past and future of artificial life (see [1]), and the conference was
preceded by widespread interest in formulating a set of grand challenges in artificial
life. As a second generation of scientists commences work in this field, many agreed
that a publicly recorded list of grand challenges could serve both to better define the
core character and objectives of this interdisciplinary activity and to provide starting
points for useful new contributions.
The conference organizers took on the task of achieving a coherent and precisely
documented list of such challenges. The conference concluded with a round table
discussion at which panelists (including all the authors of this document) presented
challenges chosen from a larger list that they had collectively suggested. Further con-
tributions followed from the floor, with participation from a large proportion of the
conference delegates. Subsequently, all of this information was restructured and signif-
icantly extended by the conference organizers (in consultation with the other panelists),
and that work culminated in the list presented here. While not completely democratic,
we hope our list presents a sensible compromise between representing a diversity of
views and constituting a coherent and structured list of challenges.
Artificial life is foremost a scientific rather than an engineering endeavor. Given how
ignorant we still are about the emergence and evolution of living systems, artificial
life should emphasize understanding first and applications second, so the challenges
we list below focus on the former. Although no monetary incentive is provided, the
authors believe that the community will vigorously contest the challenges and that their
solutions will bring rich rewards in terms of both recognition for those who solve them
and scientific accomplishment across the fields within artificial life. As with Hilbert’s
problems, formulating a clear and fruitful challenge provides direction for, rather than
replacing, shorter-term (e.g. five year) research goals, so the challenges reported here
are unabashedly long term. However, the potential exists for some significant progress
on at least the first ten in the next decade.
2 A List of Open Problems
The following is a structured list of key open problems in artificial life. Some goals
involve practical synthesis; others involve theoretical analysis. The aim is not necessarily
to make each problem wholly independent of the others; some problems overlap or
complement others, which may help to triangulate the deeper issues.
The challenges are classified under three broad issues: the transition to life, the
evolutionary potential of life, and the relation between life and mind and culture. The
challenges falling under the third issue are necessarily more speculative and open-
ended, so this whole list may best be viewed as ten challenges plus four areas of
investigation. Moreover, some of the questions about mind and culture interweave
scientific and nonscientific issues. Those issues are still important, though, not least
because addressing them is probably the best way to clarify what in this area can be
known scientifically.
A. How does life arise from the nonliving?
1. Generate a molecular proto-organism in vitro.
2. Achieve the transition to life in an artificial chemistry in silico.
3. Determine whether fundamentally novel living organizations can exist.
4. Simulate a unicellular organism over its entire lifecycle.
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5. Explain how rules and symbols are generated from physical dynamics in
living systems.
B. What are the potentials and limits of living systems?
6. Determine what is inevitable in the open-ended evolution of life.
7. Determine minimal conditions for evolutionary transitions from specific to
generic response systems.
8. Create a formal framework for synthesizing dynamical hierarchies at all scales.
9. Determine the predictability of evolutionary consequences of manipulating
organisms and ecosystems.
10. Develop a theory of information processing, information flow, and
information generation for evolving systems.
C. How is life related to mind, machines, and culture?
11. Demonstrate the emergence of intelligence and mind in an artificial living
system.
12. Evaluate the influence of machines on the next major evolutionary transition
of life.
13. Provide a quantitative model of the interplay between cultural and biological
evolution.
14. Establish ethical principles for artificial life.
This list of challenges could be extended, of course. Some fundamental questions are
missing, the most notable being the nature of life itself. This question is presupposed by
a number of the problems listed, however, and answering any problem will necessarily
involve resolving anything it presupposes. Stating each challenge precisely enough that
progress toward its solution can be unambiguously measured is often beyond our grasp.
However, where ambiguity remains, the discussion and evaluation of potential solutions
can significantly clarify the challenge and contribute toward its eventual solution, in part
by identifying and solving precise subproblems of those challenges. The authors are
also aware that this list under-represents some areas in which artificial life plays a
significant role, such as robotics, games, and art. In addition to promoting work on the
issues listed here, the authors seek to prompt others to identify and publicize additional
fundamental challenges. Discussion about whether to add new challenges to the list
will itself facilitate progress throughout the field and we purposefully avoid the bias that
would be introduced by citing what we think is the most important work on each topic.
3 Explanation of the Challenges
The aim of this section is to describe the challenges as precisely as possible and to
provide one or two starting points in existing research for those seeking their solution.
Existing research is mentioned only to clarify the context of a challenge; an exhaustive
review of prior work is well beyond the scope of this paper.
3.1 Generate a Molecular Proto-organism in Vitro
One of artificial life key goals is constructing a life form in the laboratory from scratch,
and the first targets in this quest should be the simplest possible forms of life. Molecular
life is understood as a self-reproducing organizational form constructing itself in a simple
environment and capable of evolution. The environment may be defined either by
natural geochemistry or artificially, but should involve only simple forms of energy and
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material, so that the goal is to create an encapsulated biochemical system that can derive
energy from simple chemicals or light (a simple form of metabolism, e.g. by redox
coupling) and use information carried in primitive genes. This proto-organism, which
may be held together by a lipid aggregate, should be able to self-replicate, use energy
and nutrients from its environment, undergo evolutionary changes over time, and die.
Artificial life research has succeeded in creating both self-replicating (templating)
molecules that show limited evolution, and self-replicating compartments (micelles,
lipid aggregates). However, combining these in an autonomous, evolvable, self-replicat-
ing autopoietic system remains a challenge. Complementing this bottom-up approach,
a top-down approach based on the success of genomic research may point the way
to a solution while not constituting one. Genomics researchers are whittling down the
simplest contemporary cells (e.g., mycoplasmas) to reduce the genetic complexity to a
point where synthesis might be possible.
3.2 Demonstrate an Artificial Chemistry in Which the Transition to Life
Occurs in Silico
Few questions concerning living systems are as fundamental as the spontaneous gen-
eration of life, and a constructive context in which to explore this issue is artificial
chemistry. Artificial chemistries are computer-based model systems composed of ob-
jects (abstractions of molecules), which are generated by collision between existing
objects according to a predefined interaction law. The collisions may be purely ran-
dom or allow the buildup of spatial correlations, as in diffusion systems. Bimolecular
chemistry is assumed to be sufficient to display the transition to life, but this may in-
volve complex structures. The chemistry may be stochastic rather than deterministic,
but should be constructive rather than descriptive; that is, an interaction law should
predict (like an algorithm) the product molecules for colliding objects of arbitrary com-
plexity. Furthermore, the chemical interaction law should be simple compared with
the collective solutions to the problem. Further restriction on reversible chemistries
and those satisfying conservation laws (like mass and energy) might make the problem
harder but more interesting. Although judging the success of solutions to this challenge
requires a clear definition of life, the debate about success in this problem should con-
tribute to our understanding of life. As a starting point, we may use the definition
outlined in the first challenge.
Artificial chemistries have been investigated by many authors in spaces of various
dimensionalities, with deterministic and probabilistic interaction laws. Molecules have
been abstracted using cellular automata, secondary structure folding algorithms, fi-
nite state automata, Turing machines, von Neumann machines, and the lambda calcu-
lus. Note that the challenge requires a self-organized collection of separate artificial
molecules to stably reconstruct, replicate, and evolve (as in the physical case of chal-
lenge 1). The spontaneous generation of self-replicating and evolving programs in
computer memory seeded with random machine language instructions would fall short
of this goal unless the internal organization of these “organisms” and the boundaries
separating them from their environment arise and are sustained through the activities
of lower-level primitives.
3.3 Determine Whether Fundamentally Novel Living Organizations Can Exist
Artificial life calls special attention to the question of whether there can be forms of life
that are fundamentally different from the familiar biological instances. For example, life
as we know it encodes information needed to re-create structures that cannot be copied
directly (such as proteins) in combinatorial structures that can be copied generically
(genes). Such genetic organization may be based on information encoded in various
physical degrees of freedom (not necessarily just molecular). This challenge involves
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either proving that such organization is necessary for life or producing a fundamentally
different living organization either in wet carbon chemistry or in a different medium.
As above, the debate about what is “fundamentally different” will help to clarify our
definition and understanding of life. Two categories of solution involve novel genetic
organizations and non-genetic organizations. Achieving this challenge will be a big
step toward discerning the boundaries of life as it could be.
The central dogma of molecular biology and an essentially universal genetic code
are examples of strongly conserved organizational themes of living organisms. As
an example, Eigen [7] gave a strong argument that autocatalytic sets without genetic
underpinning have a problem in principle with evolvability. No proof of this con-
clusion has been given, but examples to date of autocatalytic sets without replicable
elements have failed to exhibit convincing evolution. This may serve as one starting
point for those interested in this challenge. Other examples of “fundamentally dif-
ferent” organizations include those without spatially localized individuals, hierarchical
organization, genotype-phenotype distinction, or, indeed, any symbolic representation
scheme. Macroscopic self-reproducing machines (robots), perhaps living in colonies
and exploiting local resources to maintain themselves and grow, might give rise to a
significantly different set of organizational possibilities and constraints. The question is
also relevant to the recently renewed quest for life in the universe (e.g. at the NASA
Astrobiology Institute), since different organizational schemes may further expand the
range of possible habitats for life. Additional suggestions for addressing this challenge
might be found at the borderline of what we understand as life on our planet, such as
evolving populations of clay crystallites [4] and (although this is more controversial at
present) the so-called “nanobes” (nano-scale organisms) recently found in Triassic and
Jurassic sandstones [18].
3.4 Simulate a Unicellular Organism over Its Entire Life Cycle
In contrast with the first two challenges, this one involves simulating an existing biologi-
cal organism on the computer, and the goal is for all of the organism’s essential dynamics
to emerge from a bottom-up simulation. The artificial organism should exhibit virtu-
ally its complete spectrum of behavior, including its ability to evolve. Of course, this
behavior will be somewhat unrealistic, because our ability to model complex physical
systems is only approximate. Nevertheless, since biological organization is statistical,
it is conceivable that the dynamics of a cell can be integrated to produce identical
macroscopic behavior under a wide range of stimuli and environmental conditions.
The existence of a complete genome for simple organisms (such as mycoplasmas)
definitely takes us one step towards meeting this challenge. The integration of the
simulation of many thousands of proteins, and genetic as well as regulatory networks,
at the level of deterministic kinetics would already provide important novel quantitative
understanding of cell cycle dynamics. However, for moderate completeness, simulating
the folding of all biopolymers and their reactions and supramolecular interactions is still
a formidable challenge, since current successes in folding are statistical rather than ab
initio, and vast progress in integrating molecular dynamics on time scales of minutes
to hours is needed. Even compared with large current simulations, we would need a
factor of at least 103 in volume and 1012 in time to attain a bottom-up simulation on the
time scale of replication. Now 1015 … 250, so that if computer performance continues to
improve as in recent years, the simple molecular dynamics version of this goal should
be achievable this century. Better algorithms and understanding may well accelerate
progress, but those tackling the challenge may also have to deal with the prediction of
fluctuation-dependent chemical reactivity, which may require still more computational
effort. On the other hand, combinations of (for example) reaction kinetics, molecular
dynamics simulations, and lattice gas simulations would be more powerful than any
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single simulation approach. Whether the number of configurational variants that need
to be sampled in the course of such a simulation will be feasible for capturing essential
evolutionary behavior is an open question involving both technical progress (in hard-
ware and software) and scientific progress (in understanding the essential features of
macromolecular dynamics for cells).
3.5 Explain How Rules and Symbols are Generated from Physical Dynamics in
Living Systems
In contrast with popular theories of evolution, in which evolution is defined with respect
to given symbolic genes and rules such as for replication or recombination, a proper
theory of evolving life must allow evolution to create new symbolic descriptions and
rules to manipulate them. In general, these entities are formed by an underlying physi-
cal dynamics, and then evolution sharpens and reinforces this symbolic level. How can
such systems be modeled effectively where no state transition rules at the new sym-
bolic level are specified in advance, in contrast with current modeling practice. One
may try to mitigate this drawback by successively imposing additional constraints, but
the challenge is to allow these dynamical constraints to emerge from the underlying
dynamical system. This appears essential for modeling spontaneity or autonomy in life.
In fact, there are two issues here: how physics can give rise to dynamical systems that
can operate on the symbolic level, and how and why physical systems that are alive
tend to expand and refine their symbolic platform. The first part of the challenge is
to provide a theory explaining how dynamical systems can generate phenomena best
understood as novel symbolic and rule-based behavior, that is, creating novel proper-
ties independent of detailed fluctuations in configuration. The second part is to specify
under what conditions a natural discrete classification of dynamical states is recognized
and reinforced by a dynamical system itself to structure its future evolution.
About 30 years ago, Howard Pattee [15, 16] reduced higher rules to non-holonomic
constraints in physical systems, but the challenge here is to account for the evolution of
these dynamical constraints. Starting with rules at a low level of description, one needs
to study the formation of a rule at a higher level. Symbolic states, on which the rules act,
must be formed as relatively stable states, like attractors in the underlying dynamical
system, but also have inner degrees of freedom allowing them to undergo a transition
only when certain other (symbolically characterizable) dynamical conditions are met.
A rule that drives other states must be formed as an approximate structure in the system
and it appears appropriate to consider the formation of rules and symbols together from
a continuous description. The standard dynamical systems approach, albeit seemingly
more suitable for this challenge than an automaton approach, may not suffice to fully
resolve the issue of rule creation. Mathematicians recognize the difference between
(a) dynamical relations between objects and (b) structure that reflects rules for this
dynamics (as in modern algebra, category theory for instance), but a novel mathematical
formulation will be necessary to show how one gives rise to the other. One promising
direction may be provided by function dynamics, where the dynamics of functions
rather than states is studied.
Genetic models of evolution start with a discrete state space in the form of het-
eropolymers of defined sequence, but in which the transmission of information (reading
the symbols) is probabilistic. The quasispecies theory of Eigen [7] already demonstrates
how information can then be generated from physical dynamics, selection being achiev-
able through differences in rate coefficients for the production and destruction of such
polymers. Chemical kinetics also provides a convincing theory to explain the relatively
discrete logic of gene expression for example based on allosteric effects, following the
tradition of Monod [14]. The new field of DNA computing has already made it clear that
symbol-based rules grounded in the physics of DNA can be advanced to complete uni-
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versal computation. However, there is currently no clear indication for the conditions
under which a discrete symbolic formulation is conducive to inheritance and survival
in an evolving system, and a successful response to this challenge would provide an
explanation for the apparent tendency towards symbolic knowledge in biology.
3.6 Determine What Is Inevitable in the Open-Ended Evolution of Life
This challenge concerns the contingency of life. In different historical unfoldings of
the evolutionary process and in evolution in other media, two related questions arise:
(a) What are the features common to all evolutionary processes, or to broad classes of
evolutionary processes? (b) Do different evolutionary processes contain fundamentally
different evolutionary potential? Resolution of the first question will be analogous to
results in dynamical systems theory on genericity and structural stability, and to results
in statistical mechanics regarding universality, that is, independence of macroscopic
phenomena with respect to microscopic detail.
If the organization of living organisms is their major distinguishing feature within
an evolutionary process, and the selection of living organisms is primarily dictated by
their interactions with other organisms, then there is some reason to expect that the
major features of biology are independent of the underlying physical media support-
ing life. Digital processing in computers appears to be a very different medium from
molecular biology, yet digital organisms based on genetic and cellular principles have
been constructed in controlled operating system environments. In digital media one
has considerable scope to vary the type of “physics” underlying the evolutionary pro-
cess, and so it is straightforward to investigate the question of environmental and rule
contingency. A key challenge is whether digital systems based on symbolic logic har-
bor the same potential for evolutionary innovation as physical systems. A preliminary
challenge is to unlock the full potential of evolution in digital media. Many believe that
digital life today falls far short in this regard, and this issue is starting to be approached
quantitatively. Finally, the question of “what would remain the same if the tape of
life were replayed” [9] in its narrowest form refers to an identical geophysico-chemical
environment and concerns the reproducibility of the evolutionary process. Clearly the
time series of many of the innovative discoveries of living systems are subject to ex-
treme variation, but would the character of the ultimate organisms and ecologies be
different in a second evolution of life?
The question of chemical contingency can be answered for local mechanisms by syn-
thetic construction, as has been begun for alternative genetic molecules by varying the
sugar moiety (e.g. hexose nucleic acids [8]). Physical contingency is being approached
by using very different building blocks, such as plastic disks at interfaces, and evolv-
able hardware of varying kinds—that is, by shifting to a different physical domain rather
than changing any physical laws. Lenski’s work with replicate lines of E. coli that are
forced to adapt to a change in carbon source illustrate how historical contingency in
biological evolution can be addressed experimentally today [17]. Historical contingency
in a broader context or over a longer time scale must be answered by simulation, which
of course is more tractable for digital life. A significant answer to this question appears
achievable by combining these approaches but requires a major effort.
3.7 Determine Minimal Conditions for Evolutionary Transitions from Specific
to Generic Response Systems
This challenge concerns the interplay between evolution and learning prior to mind
(i.e., between heriditary and acquired information) in the evolutionary formation of
response systems. In particular, this challenge distinguishes between specific, special-
purpose response systems that embody a narrow range of organismic functionality,
and generic response systems that embody a broad range of organismic functionality.
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The challenge is to understand how relatively general systems within an individual for
sensing and responding to environmental change can arise in the course of evolution.
One example is the development of motile response of an organism to environ-
mental stimuli. A particular example is irritability, which has long been considered
a defining property of life. Even single-celled modern organisms show a remarkable
ability to sense and respond to their environment. The presence of predators is an ob-
vious example of a major short-term fluctuation in the environment affecting survival
that motivates a motile response; another is competition for resources, such as light
for a growing leaf affected by the growth of other leaves or plants. The variable geo-
metric relationships in such interactions require a generic response such as directional
avoidance. Another example is the development of mechanisms for defense against
molecular invasion. For complex multicellular organisms, antibody variability within an
immune system provides a near-universal encoding scheme for responding to molecular
invasion. Simpler organisms have restriction enzymes that recognize foreign DNA, and
metabolic activity is modulated by a system for regulating gene expression in response
to resource variations. In this sense, the proteins coded by DNA also provide fairly
complete coverage (extended by small cofactors) of the chemical world of catalytic
reactions. A final example is the evolution of high-order nervous systems and brains.
At the level of cultural evolution, the eye and brain have attained an extraordinarily
generic representation scheme enabling the copying of the behavior of other organisms.
One starting point for a solution is to investigate the evolution of artificial life models
with short-term fluctuations in survival. There would appear to be a minimum complex-
ity of environmental variation to warrant a generic response system. If other organisms
are the major source of such variation, how does the evolution of such generic re-
sponse mechanisms interact with ecology and population diversity? An indication that
such effects are important in evolution theory is given by recent attention to the Bald-
win effect [2], highlighting one subtle relationship between acquired characteristics and
evolutionary optimization. Although such questions are central to evolutionary biology,
they are difficult to address theoretically in biology without resorting to the artificial life
context, where greater flexibility in experimental design and increased measurement
precision are readily available. Phrased in terms of information flow, this challenge
also has bearing on challenge 10 below. Furthermore, it provides a precursor at the
molecular level to the more complex issues of challenge 11.
3.8 Create a Formal Framework for Synthesizing Dynamical Hierarchies at All
Scales
In biological systems hierarchies with multiple functionalities at different scales can
be found everywhere. Clearly we have the fundamental coarse-grained hierarchy that
may be expressed as: ecosystems (including social systems), organisms, organs, tissues,
cells, organelles, molecules, atoms, which have many refinements and substructures.
Obviously, the properties associated with each level are generated by the collective
dynamics of the elements in these dynamical hierarchies. One problem here is to
create a formal framework for consistently describing such hierarchical systems, with
some coarse-graining procedure for moving between levels.
A second issue is how these complex and robust functionalities are generated in
biological (and protobiological) systems. We know that novel functionalities in molec-
ular systems can arise in at least two ways: by assembly and by evolution. Molecular
self-assembly processes are probably most central as a mechanism for bridging non-
living and living matter, for the transition from prokaryotic to eukaryotic organisms,
and perhaps for other major biological transition processes. Self-assembly and self-
organization allow limited inherited information to code for complex functionalities,
from enzyme catalysts to the brain. It is probably necessary to embrace assembly
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and evolution as two complementary and perhaps equally important aspects of how
to generate bio-complexity if one is to account for the generation and prevalence of
dynamical hierarchies in living systems.
Finally, it is unclear how to simulate either the generation or the functioning of such
multi-level systems, because their dynamics are characterized by multiple length and
time scales and both computational power and a general theory are missing. This is
also one of the barriers faced in solving challenge 4.
3.9 Determine the Predictability of Evolutionary Manipulations of Organisms
and Ecosystems
One of the most pressing practical issues facing humankind is how our activities affect
our environment. But before we can evaluate these effects, we need to understand
the extent to which they can be predicted. This is part of a larger issue involving the
predictability of the effects of manipulating ecosystems of all sizes and kinds. The
ecosystems of interest include those as different as the entire global biosphere and
individual human immune systems, and ecological manipulations range from industrial
pollution, climate change, and large-scale mono-crop agriculture to the introduction of
genetically engineered organisms. Although such manipulations have effects on both
relatively short and relatively long time scales, the present challenge focuses specifically
on evolutionary consequences.
Organisms can be externally directed by manipulations of their environment to per-
form external tasks (e.g. from catalyzing specific chemical reactions to running artificial
mazes) and transgenically manipulated to function differently by expressing different
genes, but the evolutionary consequences and limits of such manipulations are not
clear. How far can one rationally redesign or rapidly select organisms to fulfill mul-
tiple novel criteria without disturbing the viability of the organisms’ organization and
defense systems? Is there a tradeoff between utility and viability, or between size of
modification and duration of organism utilization? These questions become even more
of a challenge when it comes to manipulating ecosystems. The importance of assessing
the potential costs and benefits of these manipulations (see the final challenge, Sec-
tion 3.14) is underscored by the fact that these manipulations are already becoming
common in restricted contexts.
With increasing understanding of the genetic control of development, it will be
possible to create novel multicellular organisms through sequential genetic reprogram-
ming. Do we need long-term evolutionary optimization to support or perfect such
major changes to organisms? Widespread application of such manipulations could also
rapidly increase biodiversity without creating the variation in the gene pool necessary
for longer-term evolution. Speciation and extinction are ubiquitous features of evolu-
tionary history, but the long-term implications of frequent artificial speciation for biodi-
versity and sustainability are unknown. Addressing this challenge requires combining
an understanding of evolution theory with theoretical experimentation in artificial life
models that constructively address hypothetical changes to organisms and ecosystems.
Progress on this challenge should have an impact on guidelines for intervening in
biological and technological contexts with evolutionary implications.
3.10 Develop a Theory of Information Processing, Information Flow, and
Information Generation for Evolving Systems
Information plays three distinct roles in evolving systems: transmission, processing,
and generation. The challenge refers to all three, and they are listed here in order of
the degree to which we presently understand them, and hence inversely with respect
to the challenge they represent.
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Firstly, there appear to be two complementary kinds of information transmission in
living systems. One is the conservative hereditary transmission of information through
evolutionary time. The other is transmission of information specified in a system’s
physical environment to components of the system, possibly mediated by the com-
ponents themselves, with the concomitant possibility of a combination of information
processing and transmission. The latter is clearly also linked with the generation of
information (to be discussed last). Clarifying the range of possibilities for information
transmission, and determining which of those possibilities the biosphere exploits, is a
fundamental enquiry of artificial life.
Secondly, the challenge is to unify evolution with information processing. One start-
ing point is the observation that components of evolving systems (organisms or groups
of organisms) seem to solve problems as part of their existence. It is this capability
that led to the creation of the genetic algorithm [10] and its many applications. More
generally, theory must address what the capacity of an evolving system’s information
processing is, and how it changes with evolution. Are there thresholds between levels
of information processing during evolution that match the levels identified in automata
theory—for example, from finite state machines to universal computation? How do the
algorithms employed by organisms classify in terms of their problem solving efficiency?
The third and least-understood role of information is its generation during evolution.
As evolution takes place, evolving systems seem to become more complex; success-
fully quantifying complexity and its increase during evolution is one important part of
understanding information generation. Another problem in this area is that of under-
standing how complexity in an evolving system’s environment can affect the complexity
of the organisms that are evolving within the environment. Nature seems not to have
evolved Lamarckian mechanisms to incorporate environmental information from one
generation’s experience directly into the genome of the next generation, but the char-
acteristics of an environment must inevitably be reflected indirectly in the organisms
that evolve within it (a transmission of information from environment to genome). Fi-
nally, the environment itself is made up of a physical, nonliving component plus all
the living components themselves. The theory envisioned must address the resultant
compounding of the informational context continually being built and expanded by
the evolutionary process.
3.11 Demonstrate the Emergence of Intelligence and Mind in an Artificial
Living System
It is natural to wonder about the relationship between life and mind. They appear
coextensive in nature, and the distribution of different kinds of mental capacities (sen-
sitivity to the environment, internal information processing, etc.) across life forms
seems roughly to reflect the sophistication of those life forms. Two deep issues in
this area arise for artificial life. The first is substantive: whether and, if so, how the
natures of life and mind are intrinsically connected. The second is methodological:
whether it is most profitable to study mind and intelligence only when embodied in
living systems. Both issues motivate artificial life’s existing attention to autonomous
agents and embodied cognition, and they bear on artificial life’s relation to its elder
sister, artificial intelligence. Progress on this challenge will shed new light on many
current controversies in both fields, such as the extent to which life and mind should
be viewed as “computational.” A constructive approach to all these concerns is to try
to demonstrate the emergence of intelligence and mind in an artificial living system.
The history of artificial intelligence shows how controversial it is to settle whether a
model demonstrates intelligence or mind, and addressing this controversy from within
the self-referential context provided by evolving systems is one point of this challenge.
To make progress, one must have a method to detect intelligence and mind when they
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are present in a system. Consciousness is the most difficult aspect of mind to detect,
and initial progress is certain to be somewhere else. A more tractable aspect of mind to
detect is meaning, that is, internal states that have semantic or representational signifi-
cance for the entity and that influence the entity’s behavior by means of their semantic
content. One guide for progress in this vein is artificial life’s extensive current research
on the evolution of communication. The easiest aspect of mind and intelligence to
detect is flexible adaptive behavior, i.e., the capacity to act appropriately in a complex
dynamic environment. Maturana and Varela [12], among others, view this capacity as
the hallmark of both cognition and life. This capacity obviously comes in degrees, and
most existing artificial life work illustrates it to some extent. Further progress involves,
among other things, clearly delineating the different degrees or stages of this capacity,
and having increasingly sophisticated forms of this capacity emerge from increasingly
impoverished initial conditions.
3.12 Evaluate the Influence of Machines on the Next Major Evolutionary
Transition of Life
Once life originated, biological evolution underwent a number of major evolutionary
transitions, and presumably there are more to come. Even though the identification
of “major” transitions involves some inescapable arbitrariness, probably everyone will
agree that past transitions include the origin of eukaryotes, the origin of multicellular
life, and the origin of language and culture. Once culture originates, it has the capacity
to evolve on its own, and the past century has shown an explosion of technological
culture, including notably the creation of computing machines and complex distributed
informational networks connecting them. Many agree it is only a matter of time be-
fore artificial life creates machines that are alive, are intelligent, reproduce their own
kind, have their own purposes, set their own goals, and evolve autonomously. These
machines will be as much a part of the natural world as features in the landscape or
existing forms of life, and their evolution will affect the course of existing forms of
life. Think of how machines are currently ramifying the nature and rate of human
communication and interconnectedness. All this suggests that machines might play an
unprecedented role in the next major evolutionary transition, and the challenge here
is to predict and explain this role. Machines may well be the central players in the
transition, as will be the case if autonomously evolving machines get established in the
natural world. Machines might also play a supporting role in the transition by providing
an infrastructure that influences its rate or direction of change.
One place where one might seek clues for how to address this challenge is current
theories of major evolutionary transitions [13], though there is little consensus on this
subject. A second source of clues would be artificial life models that exhibit a “major”
evolutionary transition, though there is no consensus whether any such model yet
exists. A third source is to study humankind’s increasingly symbiotic relationship with
increasingly autonomous and intelligent machines. Today industrial robots are used to
produce industrial robots and Internet search engines adapt and take initiative. Relevant
here also are studies of self-programmable and evolvable machines and studies of the
robustness of informational networks. Theories of technological evolution (see the next
challenge) are a fourth possible source of clues.
3.13 Provide a Quantitative Understanding of the Interplay between Cultural
and Biological Evolution
Culture, in all its forms, is one of the products of human existence, and culture itself
evolves. Examples of cultural evolution can be found throughout the social sciences,
including the development of economic markets, the changes in technological infras-
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tructure (see the previous challenge, Section 3.12), and growth and revolution in the
community of scientific beliefs. Some treatments of cultural evolution (e.g., sociobi-
ology and evolutionary psychology) consider how cultural traits evolve due to their
effect on biological fitness. But one can also consider how cultural traits evolve in
their own right, as Dawkins did when he coined the word “meme” [6]. This sort of
“pure” cultural evolution is driven by mechanisms similar to those behind biological
evolution, but there are important differences. Evolution happens in each case because
traits exhibit variation, heritability, and differential fitness. But cultural traits are trans-
mitted not genetically but psychologically, and their fitness concerns not biological
survival and reproduction but retention in and proliferation across minds. Psycho-
logical transmission, like genetic transmission, appears to depend on the ability to
reconstruct complex behavior from the copyable structures of communication. One
fundamental question addressed by a quantitative model of the interplay between cul-
tural and biological evolution concerns the similarities and differences in the behavior
of biological and cultural evolution. For example, do the two kinds of evolutionary
processes exhibit similar generic trends (perhaps punctuated equilibria and increasing
diversification), and if so, for similar reasons? Another fundamental question con-
cerns how biological and cultural evolution are interconnected and influence each
other.
Psychological information transmission can involve speaking, writing, or non-linguis-
tic forms of behavior. Explaining psychological information transmission in terms of
standard information transmission is one preliminary step toward meeting this chal-
lenge, and subsequently relating psychological and genetic (evolutionary) information
transmission (recall challenge 10) is one strategy for doing so. Existing quantitative
theories of cultural evolution [3, 5] are another starting point for pursuing this topic.
These theories adapt analytic population biology to the context of cultural evolution,
and they include treatment of how cultural evolution and biological evolution inter-
act. However this approach has the characteristic limitations of analytical population
biology, the very limitations that drive the pursuit of synthetic bottom-up models in
artificial life.
3.14 Establish Ethical Principles for Artificial Life
Both the process of pursuing artificial life research and the scientific and practical
products of that research process raise complicated ethical issues. These issues fall
into four broad categories: (a) the sanctity of the biosphere, (b) the sanctity of human
life, (c) the responsible treatment of newly generated life forms, and (d) the risks of
exploitation of artificial life.
a. The autonomous proliferation and evolution of engineered biological systems,
whether natural or artificial, could rapidly and irreversibly change the biosphere,
and the impact of such changes is difficult to assess. This raises the question
whether there is an ethical right to introduce such systems to solve immediate
problems. Similar concerns also affect proliferation of artificial organisms on
increasingly indispensable artificial systems such as the Internet. Existing computer
viruses wreak havoc as it is, but imagine how much worse they would be if they
spontaneously evolved like artificial life systems. On the positive side, artificial life
is helping to develop new measures to protect our informational networks from
such threats, including those modeled on the immune systems found in nature.
Furthermore, the investigation of ecosystem changes in artificial environments may
help to establish guidelines for current and future interference with the biosphere,
be they by chemicals (e.g. CO2, drugs), genetic engineering, or artificial organisms.
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b. Much of current ethics is based on the sanctity of human life. Research in artificial
life will affect our understanding of life and death and the relationship between life
and mind. This, like the theory of evolution, will have major social consequences
for human cultural practices such as religion. Artificial life can also provide positive
insight, through long-term simulations, into necessary regulations and freedoms in
dealing with our evolving species. The issue of our future increasing dependence
on artificial life systems also falls under this category.
c. It is worth noting that public protocols govern the responsible treatment of human
and animal research subjects. The lack of analogous protocols in artificial life may
be no serious problem today, but as we create more sophisticated living entities we
will have to face the responsibility of treating them appropriately.
d. The practical uses of the products of artificial life research will create various costs
and benefits. For example, it is easy to imagine the military and commercial uses
of automatic adaptive control processes. Such uses of artificial life research may
create conflicts of interest for artificial life researchers, as may responsibilities
toward sources that fund artificial life research.
Artificial life’s ethical issues somewhat resemble those concerning animal experi-
mentation, genetic engineering, and artificial intelligence. The extensive literature on
the ethical issues raised in those three fields may provide some guidance for explor-
ing the ethical issues in artificial life. On the other hand, creating novel forms of life
and interacting with them in novel ways will place us in increasingly uncharted ethical
terrain.
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